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10 December 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Administration)

SUBJECT: Special Study Group Security Recommendations.

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Transmitted herewith are the comments of the Security Office on the recommendations with respect to security of the Special Study Group.

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Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

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SECURITY OFFICE COMMENTS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS

OF THE SPECIAL STUDY GROUP

1. Elimination, to the maximum extent practicable, of provisional and preliminary clearances in the security processing of prospective Agency personnel. (Action Security)

COMMENT: It is recognized that it is undesirable to have provisional and preliminary clearances, and every means possible is being used to discourage and eliminate such clearances. There is need, however, for an exception to cover hardship cases, usually in the clerical category, where the delay in committing a person to employment might result in his loss to the Agency.

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COMMENT: As a result of recent studies, certain recommendations have been prepared for consideration which relate directly to the field of covert personnel security processing. Necessary action will be taken in the immediate future to implement those recommendations which will result in material improvement along the lines suggested by the Committee.

3. Immediate completion of full field investigations and polygraph examinations of the several hundred Agency personnel who have not yet been fully processed. (Action Security)

COMMENT: The statement "several hundred Agency personnel who have not yet been fully processed" is not accurate. All staff personnel have been fully processed, with the exception of some few military personnel who were accepted on the basis of ten years satisfactory previous active service and upon whom full field investigations have not yet been completed by this office. With respect to the polygraph program, there remain at this time only seven staff employees who have not received a polygraph interview. This program is considered current.

4. Establishing of uniform and tighter security procedures at Headquarters and suitable safeguards in the field the better to insure the securi-

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ty of the Agency's facilities, operations, sources and methods. (Action Security)

COMMENT: This recommendation is stated in such broad terms that it is difficult to answer it specifically without having the benefit of the information that the Study Group used, upon which they based this recommendation. Needless to say, this Office is exerting every effort to standardize and tighten security procedures and safeguards both at Headquarters and in the field. Among the items being given particular attention at the moment are improvement of the classified waste procedures, requiring clearances of char force personnel, tightening requirements and giving special training to the guard force, tightening entrance requirements of Public Building Services employees into Agency facilities, strengthening the Top Secret Control procedures and installing additional electric alarm systems in field offices.

5. Insurance of the closest possible coordination of the counter-espionage activities of the covert services with the over-all counterintelligence activities of the Office of Security to prevent, or detect and eliminate, any penetrations of C.I.A. (Action Security)

COMMENT: Steps are now being taken with the newly designated Chief of Staff C/FI/DDP to effect the closest possible coordination. This Office is quite optimistic in anticipation of effecting a more satisfactory degree of coordination between the two offices.

6. Augmentation of the present sound policy of polygraphing all new employees and all personnel returning from overseas assignments to include periodic rechecks of all personnel, on a more comprehensive basis, whenever effective counterintelligence practices indicate. (Action Security)

COMMENT: This policy is in effect at this time, in that all new employees and all overseas returnees are being polygraphed. Re-polygraphing is being accomplished whenever indicated in the interests of CE or any other specific interest. It is considered that this program is adequate and effective in the counterintelligence program.

7. Creation of greater security consciousness on the part of all personnel by improving initial indoctrination courses and by conducting regular "security awareness" programs. (Action Security)

COMMENT: The security indoctrination program is given constant attention. The initial security indoctrination lecture has recently been revised and considerably improved. Planning is now under way to carry out an Agency-wide security re-indoctrination by means of a movie film which will carry a security message from the LCI

and which will be augmented by security talks by representatives of the Security Office and the office concerned with each group being re-indoctrinated.

8. Imposition of severe penalties upon employees at any and all levels who advertently or inadvertently violate security. (Action Security)

COMMENT: The security regulations specifically concerned with penalties for security violations have been re-written and are presently in the hands of the Regulations Control staff for publication. The penalties, as established in the proposed regulations, are set forth as "minimum" in each case, as opposed to the former regulation which set forth the penalties as a "guide." Although the proposed regulations do not make the penalties any more severe, it is felt that the establishment of minimum penalties will result in a more rigid application of the penalties across the board. An Agency notice is in process of preparation, warning all personnel that violations of Top Secret Control procedures will be considered as security violations.

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9. Establishment of a uniform system for the submission by all overseas missions of regular reports on the status of personnel, physical, documentary and related elements of security. Such reports should be submitted to the Office of Security with copies to the Inspector General and to the appropriate division of the Deputy Director of Plans. (Action DD/P)

COMMENT: An informal arrangement has been established for the submission of periodic (monthly) reports by the Security Officers in the

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[redacted] respectively. These reports are submitted through the appropriate divisions of the DD/P where copies are retained for their information. Inasmuch as the topics covered are exclusively security matters, no arrangements are made for submitting copies to the Inspector General. However, this Office would automatically apprise the Inspector General of any feature disclosed in such reports which would be of interest to him. The Security Office will urge the DD/P to have all missions and stations submit periodic security reports, including those not staffed with full-time Security Officers. This Office will supply forms for such reporting. As additional Security Officers are assigned to stations in other foreign areas, they will be required to submit reports as mentioned above.

10. Periodic security inspections by the Security Office of overseas missions and of DD/P's divisions, staffs, and facilities in the United States. (Action Security)

COMMENT: The Security Office concurs in the need for these inspections,

however, action in this regard is extremely dependant upon recognition by the DD/P and Chiefs of Missions of the need for such inspections. The Director of Security is now planning an inspection trip in January to cover various missions and stations in the WE and EE areas. This Office intends to pursue the point with the DD/P toward a mutual understanding of the need for this service, so that it may be instituted as a regular routine practice.

11. Rigid adherence to the "need-to-know" requirements as the basis for dissemination of classified intelligence developed by the covert services and for intra-Agency dissemination of classified data. (Action DD/P in coordination with DD/I)

COMMENT: The first feature cited above concerns the need-to-know requirement for the dissemination of classified intelligence developed by the covert services and is therefore properly the responsibility of the DD/P in coordination with the DD/I. With respect to the second feature concerning intra-Agency dissemination of classified data, this Office recently completed surveys covering the control and dissemination of Top Secret material within CIA and of classified material to sources outside of CIA. A report on the former survey has been submitted for implementation and a report on the outside dissemination is now in process of preparation.

12. Continuous indoctrination and guidance to correct the natural tendency to overclassify documents originating in the Agency. (Action Security)

COMMENT: The CIA classification program, as prescribed by Executive Order 10501 and Agency Notice [] is still in the formative stage. The newly appointed CIA Top Secret Control Officer is also acting as the CIA Classification Control Officer. This Office will give every assistance to the CIA Classification Officer in the indoctrination and guidance of CIA personnel in the matter of applying the proper classifications to sensitive material.

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13. Promulgation of definitive standards and procedures governing cover for the guidance of all personnel. There should be a continuing program of monitoring cover in foreign installations. Personnel departing for overseas assignments should be more adequately briefed concerning the importance of cover generally, and in particular their mission and personal cover. (Action DD/I)

COMMENT: The Security Office has no comment to offer with respect to this matter other than to re-emphasize its readiness and willingness

to assist the various components of the Agency, in coordination with FI/Plans/Cover Division, in resolving any cover or related problems through its investigative facilities and support activities or through consultation where appropriate.

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17. Concentration of CIA's Headquarters operations in fewer buildings with increased emphasis in the interim on improvement of the physical security of CIA's many buildings and the classified data and materials contained therein. (Action FI/A)

COMMENT: The Security Office concurs in this recommendation.